International Macroeconomic Policy: When Wealth Affects People's Impatience by Wang Peng & Heng-fu Zou
  1 
International Macroeconomic Policy   
When Wealth Affects People’s Impatience 
Heng-fu Zou, Peng Wang 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China 
First Version: April, 2004   
 
Very Preliminary Version 
 
Abstract 
Under a modified neo-classical framework, this paper reexamined the effect of 
international macroeconomic policies by rejecting the routine assumption  of a 
constant rate of time preference. In the model presented here, we suppose the holdings 
of real financial wealth will affect people’s impatience which has far-reaching 
implications towards various core issues in international macroeconomics. The 
introducing of wealth into instantaneous  discounting  function yields  intriguing 
dynamics of consumption, real balances, and foreign bond holdings. One interesting 
feature of our model is that stationary rate of time preference no longer necessarily 
equals real interest rate. We also find that central bank’s foreign exchange intervention 
is not super-neutral even if households capitalize all transfers from the government, 
which contradicts Obstfeld(1981) in that the distribution of the economy’s claims on 
the rest of the world between the public and the central bank is relevant to the 
economic performance.  The monetary policy affects the real factors, but how the 
economy behaves in the long run and in the short run differs a lot from Uzawa(1968) 
and Obstfeld(1981).   
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Part I Introduction 
The neoclassical theory of optimal growth assumes that people have stationary 
time preferences in that they discount the future with a constant exponential rate. 
However, recent studies (Ainslie [1992]) suggest that people are highly impatient 
about consuming between today and tomorrow but are much more patient about 
choices advanced further in the future. Motivated by such findings, Laibson have 
done a series of works examining intertemporal choices of hyperbolic consumers 
(Laibson [1994], [1996], [1997], [1998]). 
The main problem associated with hyperbolic individuals is the fundamental 
asymmetry between the present and future selves, which is called the 
time-inconsistent problem. Individuals are assumed to be composed of conflicting 
selves --- current self and future selves. Each self is tied to choices of all other selves. 
At an equilibrium, each self choose optimal strategies given the strategies of all other 
selves. 
Barro [1999] incorporates hyperbolic discounting into the standard Ramsey 
model, with an re-examination of individual choices under different commitment 
assumptions. He proves that in the case of no commitment and log utility, the 
equilibrium features a constant effective rate of time preference and is observationally 
equivalent to the standard Ramsey model. First he guesses the solution with an 
undetermined parameter, and then solves the parameter under an intra-personal Nash 
equilibrium. Note that the first-best choice, characterized by the conventional 
Hamiltonian system, is never a stable one, since future selves will intrinsically not 
obey the plans made by current self; instead, all future selves have a tendency to 
deviate from what previous self has planned because they have better choices under 
their own beliefs. In the sense of such facts, the only stationary choice (or enforceable 
consumption plan) is given by an intra-personal Nash equilibrium as in Barro [1999]. 
The method he uses will be summarized in Section 2, which we will use throughout 
this paper. 
Another problem related to hyperbolic representatives is the uniqueness of the   3 
Nash equilibrium, to which Barro [1999] refers as a footnote after he works out the 
time-consistent solution. Laibson [1996] has proved the uniqueness of the solution in 
a discrete-time model, given that the utility function is concave, not just for log utility. 
In Barro’s analysis, however, the long-run discount rate was assumed to a strictly 
positive constant, and thus could not explain why different countries have various 
preference structures. For example, empirical studies imply that people in wealthy 
countries tend to have a higher discount rate than those in poor countries, and wealthy 
people are more impatient than poor people. Motivated by such evidence, we assume 
that the long-run discount rate is endogenously determined by capital. Raising the 
level of real assets increases the rate of time preference and future consumption. This 
does not contradict the accepted intuition that savings are a decreasing function of 
financial wealth as described by the Mundell-Tobin effect. Epstein and Hynes [1983] 
first offered the intuition for using wealth effects to transform time preference into an 
endogenous function, but it received only a footnote. They argue that monetary 
growth raises the opportunity cost of holding real balances, which shifts a positively 
sloped rate of time preference function down along a negatively sloped marginal 
product of capital locus. This reduces the real interest rate and increases steady state 
capital according to the Mundell-Tobin effect. 
 
 
Part II The Model 
1. Households’ Choice 
The firm and the household can be aggregated as a representative private agent in an 
economy, whose marginal impatience increases
1  as wealth level expands modeled by 
an endogenous preference structure. Define the financial wealth of households by 





where  y   is the real output, which is taken to be exogenous and constant; r 
                                                   
1  For the purpose of a saddle-point stable equilibrium.   4 
represents the constant world bond rate;  t m   denotes real balances;  t F   is  family’s 
net foreign claims. We suppose households capitalize all future real output. And thus 
the output flow is equivalent to an interest-baring financial asset with face value  y . 
In each period, the households also receive real net transfers of amount  t t   from the 
government. Thus the resource constraint is given by 
  t t t t t tt m F y rF c m tπ + =+ +−−   . 
Using our definition of wealth, we can rewrite the resource constraint as 
() t ttt t t a ra c r m tπ = +−− +  . 
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In  addition, we suppose  (, ) () ( ) Ucm uc vm = +, 
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2 3( ) ρ ρρ ′ ′′ ≤ .
2  As in Uzawa(1968) and Obstfeld(1981), we simplify the calculations 
by introducing the psychological time  ∆, which is characterized by  () t d a dt ρ ∆=
3. 
The household’s problem now may be expressed as choosing flow of consumption 
and real balances that satisfy 
max  
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2  These restrictions on utility function and discount function will confirm the strict concavity of our objective 
function. 
3  Suppose  () ρ ⋅   is bounded blow by some positive number, say  0 ρ > . Then  ∆  will go from 0 to  ∞when 
t   evolves from 0 to  ∞.   5 
To ensure the problem has an optimal solution, we adopt the standard assumption of a 
concave utility function as in standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model.   
The necessary conditions for optimality are given by the maximum principle. These 
require that consumption and real balances be chosen so that for each value of the 
discount factor  ∆, the Hamiltonian 
 
(, ) [ ( ) ]
() ()







= +   (1) 
is maximized. In the above equation, λλ ∆ = is the co-state variable, which is 
interpreted as shadow price, in utility terms, of real assets. The short-run equilibrium 
is characterized by first order conditions (at the interior maximum) as follows: 
  (, ) c U cm λ =   (2) 
  (, ) ( ) m U cm r λπ = +   (3) 
The above two equations imply the usual necessary condition of static utility 
maximization as in Sidrauski(1967), 
  (, ) (, ) / (, ) tt m tt c tt t x cm U cm Ucm r π ≡=+ ,  (4) 
in which the right side represents the opportunity cost of holding real balances instead 









.  (5) 
Transform the psychological time into real time, and we will have 
  (() ) () t t t tt a r aH λ λρ ρ ′ = −+    (6) 
Transversality condition is given by 
 
0 lim 0 ae λ
−∆
∆→ = .  (7) 
 
We assume that the central bank varies  t t   in such a way as to hold the rate of 
monetary growth  / tt MM  constant at some level, say  µ . 
  tt m rR g tµ = +− .  (8)   6 
Using the necessary conditions, we may solve for the co-state variable  t λ  
  (, ) t tt cm λλ =   (9) 
Differentiating both sides of the above equation with respect to time yields 
  (() ) () t tc tt tm t t a cm r aH λλ λρ λ ρ ′ −+ = +=   ,  (10) 
which may be solved for the time path of consumption, by applying the dynamics of 
co-state variable along with that of real balances, 
 
1 ( ) { [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( , )]} ( , , ) t c t t t t m t tt tt t c a r aH m r x cm cmF λ λρ ρ λ µ ψ
− ′ =− + − +− ≡    (11) 
 
2. Perfect-Foresight Equilibrium Dynamics 
As in Brock(1974) and Obstfeld(1981), we first define by a (differentiable) price-level 
path  ˆ {} t P   and the associated path of nominal transfer payments from the government 
0 { }{ }
t
tt t t P e M PrR Pg
µ tµ = +− , where  0 M   denotes the nominal money stock at 
0 t = .   
 
The differential equation governing the evolution of real balances in perfect-foresight 
equilibrium is given by 
  [ ( , )] t tt t m r xc m m µ = +−  .  (12) 
Substitute the above equation in to the flow constraint, and we will have 
  () t tt F y rF R c g =+ + −−    (13) 
 
 
The steady state  (, , ) cmF  is characterized by  0 cmF = = =   , which means 
  (, , ) (, ) ( ) 0 cmF r xcm y rF R c g ψµ = +− =+ + −− =   (14) 
Adding the assumption that  0 r µ +>  will guarantee the existence of the steady state. 
Linearizing the three-dimension dynamic system around the steady state  (, , ) cmF 
yields   7 
  ()( )( ) cm F c cc mm FF ψψ ψ = −+ −+ −  ,  (15) 
  () ( ) cm m xmc c xmm m = − −− −  ,  (16) 
  ( )( ) F c c rF F = −− + −  ,  (17) 
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. To prove the stability of the steady state, we 
calculate the trace and determinant of  T   repectively, 
() () 0 m trace T a x m ρ = −> ,   
( ) () () () cm mc Fm D e tT xmr xmr xm ψψψ =− +− +−  
      
() ( ) () (2 ) ( )
0
c m c c m cm
c
r xm r r r mxr x H xr x λρ λρ λ ρ ρ
λ
′ ′′ −− + −+ − + −
=< , 
which implies that among the three characteristic roots of  T , one must be negative 
and the other two must be positive. Thus there must a saddle-point stable path towards 
the steady state.   
Our next step is to prove the uniqueness of the stable path. Let  1 θ   denote the 
negative root with a corresponding eigenvector  123 [ , , ]' ω ωωω = . Since we have 
1 Tω ωθ = , and then  11 3 () r ωθ ω −= − , which implies  1 ω   and  3 ω   must be of the 
same sign. Further, we have  12 0 cm xm xm ωω −− = , and then it must be true that  1 ω  
and  2 ω   also have the same sign. Any convergent solution of the linearized system   8 
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in which intersection of any two hyperplanes is a saddlepath. In our subsequent 
studies, we will focus on the consumption-real balances plane.
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Part III Macro Policy Analysis 
1. Foreign Exchange Intervention 
In Obstefeld(1981), he concludes that the central bank’s purchasing of foreign 
claims from the public has no real effects on the economy, and money creation 
accomplished through a purchase of foreign exchange has the same impact as a 
“helicopter”  money-supply change of equal magnitude. These two policies are 
intrinsically the same even if the households intend to restore their holding of external 
claims to the original level, because households capitalize all transfers from the 
government. But this result is based on the assumption that the dynamics of 
consumption is related to national holdings of foreign assets,  FR + , while in our 
case, the change of public holdings of foreign assets,  F , will also affect consumption. 
Then our assumption will yield much different results from those in Obstfeld(1981). 
Assume the central bank purchase a certain mount of foreign claims from the 
public by domestic money, while keeping money growth constant at initial level. We 
first find the long run relationships between consumption, real balances, public 
                                                   
4  The saddle-point stable system is no different from that of Obstfeld(1981). But keep in mind that here the 
dynamics of consumption is affected by  F , not  FR +   as in Obstfeld(1981), and further the stationary utility 
level is no longer determined by world interest rate solely, so our model will have much different policy results 
from what Obstfeld implied.   9 
holdings of foreign assets, and central bank reserve. Differentiating  the dynamic 
system at its long run equilibrium yields 
  0 cm F dc dm dF ψψ ψ ++= ,  (21) 
  0 cm x dc x dm += ,  (22) 
  rdF rdR dc += .  (23) 
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As we know that  0 dR R = ∆> , we have  0 dc >   and  0 dm > . By easy calculation, 











, where the inequality 






ψψ −< . Thus, we have proven that 
long run level of public holdings of foreign assets and central bank reserve will move 
in opposite direction,  0 dF < . 
    As a result, the central bank’s foreign exchange intervention will have real 
effects towards the economy. In our case, real consumption and households’ holdings 
of real balances will increase, while public holdings of foreign assets will decrease in 
the long run. But the national gross holdings of foreign assets in terms of  FR +   will 
increase, because we observe that  () 0
dc
d F R dF dR
r
+=+= > . In sum, the 
intervention is no longer superneutral under our wealth-related preference structure. 
    From above, we may conclude that the instantaneous utility,  (, ) Ucm, will   10 
increase in the long run. But as for the welfare, 
0
()
0 [ ( , )]
t
a ds U




≡ ∫ ⋅= ∫ , 
there are still more to say since the discount factor is no longer an exogenous constant 
number. We cannot get further information until we have examined the long run locus 
of households’  financial wealth. Given there is no output shock, we have 
da dm dF = +, whose sign is ambiguous at first glance because we have  0 dm >   and 
0 dF < . Luckily, here we have a proposition, which states that financial wealth will 
decrease as a whole
5, and thus in the long run, the social welfare will increase as a 
result of the intervention.   
 
Proposition (Welfare implications of central bank’s intervention) 
    Assume the central bank purchases foreign assets from the public by domestic 
money. Then the  households’  total capitalized financial wealth will decrease as a 
whole in the long run. In addition, the social welfare will increase perpetually.   
 
Next, we examine the economy’s short-run behavior. As we have proven the 
uniqueness of the saddle path, we know that the economy’s optimal adjustment path is 
noncyclical. Thus we can easily describe the short-run behavior from the long-run 
locus. At the time the purchase occurs, public holdings of foreign assets decrease to 
FR −∆   suddenly, and then  F   will rise sluggishly to its long-run level  F′, which 
has the property that  F RF F ′ −∆ < <   because we have  0 dF <   and  ( )0 dF R +> . 
Since on the optimal adjustment path, consumption, real balances and public holdings 
of foreign assets will move in the same direction, the consumption and real balances 
must jump to a level lower then their former long-run level,  (, ) cm, at the initial stage, 
and then rise gradually to their new steady state,  (, ) cm ′′ , along the saddle path. Thus 
compared to the fixed rate of money growth, the exchange rate exhibits overshooting 
                                                   
5  See appendix for detailed proof.   11 
initially, causing the price level to rise relative to nominal money supply, and then 
becomes undershooting from some point in the future; in the long run the inflation 
rate and money growth rate equals. The current account will run a surplus until the 
economy reaches its new steady state. In sum, the central bank’s foreign exchange 
intervention will cause exchange rate to fluctuate during the process, even in the long 
run, and cause the current account to run a surplus in the short run. 
 
2. Monetary Policy 
Suppose there is an increase in the money growth rate --- from  µ   to  µµ ′ > . 
Our case differ from that of Obstfeld(1981)’s in that  here in the consumption-real 
balances plane, the slope of  0 c =    is ambiguous around the steady state, while in 
Obstfeld(1981), the  0 c =    curve is strictly downward sloping. And thus, the long-run 
perturbation of this policy needs further examination. Using the same methodology as 
in the last section, we differentiate the right side of the dynamic system at its 
stationary state, 
  0 cm F dc dm dF ψψ ψ ++= ,  (27) 
  cm x dc x dm dµ += ,  (28) 
  rdF dc = .  (29) 
By routine calculation, we find that 
 
1 dc C dµ
− = ,  (30) 
where  /( ) /( ) c mF m mc m Cxx r x r ψψ ψψ = −− , whose sign is ambiguous
6  since we do 
not know for sure the sign of  c ψ . 
Basically, there are two cases concerning the slope of  0 c =    curve around the 
steady state. 
                                                   
6  The sum of first two terms of  C ,  /( ) c mF m xx r ψψ − , is strictly positive, while the third term has the same 
sign as  c ψ , which is undetermined.     12 
When  the  policy  occurs, the  0 m =    will move to the right. Thus we can 
categorize the new steady state into two cases. If consumption declines in the long run, 
then the holdings of real balances will also decrease. But if consumption finally rises, 
whether the steady-state level of real balances will move upward or downward 
depends on the shape of   0 c =    curve between old and new steady states. Figures 











(Fig. 1) The new steady state has the property that  cc ′ > , and  mm ′< . We also 
observe that public holdings of foreign assets will increase to a higher stationary 
level. Because the variable  F   cannot jump, the current account must be running a 
0 m′ =   
0 m =   
0 c =    A 
c 
m   13 
surplus at the initial stage. Thus consumption decreases at first, and then adjusts to 
the new steady state along the saddle path.  As a result, public holdings of real 
balances also jump initially to a level even lower than the new steady state.   
If the foreign exchange rate fully adjusts to the monetary expansion, the real 















(Fig. 2) The new steady state has the property that  cc ′< , and  mm ′< . Public 
0 m′ =   
0 m =   




C   14 
holdings of foreign assets will decrease to a lower stationary level. Because the 
variable  F   cannot jump, the current account must be running a deficit when the 
monetary policy occurs. Thus consumption jumps to a level higher than  c   at first, 
and then adjusts to the new steady state along the saddle path. We cannot know for 
sure the move of the public holdings of real balances at the initial stage, but at the new 
steady state we have  mm ′< . The economy adjusts to a point like  B  or  C  at time 
0 t =   as the figure shows. 
The monetary policy causes consumption to fluctuate during the process, and 
have ambiguous effect on real balances in the short run. As the real balances decrease 
at the new steady state, the exchange rate will exhibit overshooting in the long run. It 
is possible that the exchange rate undershoots in the short run firstly, if the economy 
moves to a locus like  B  when the policy takes place. But if the economy is at point 







(Fig. 3) The new steady state has the property that  cc ′ > , and  mm ′ > . Public 
0 m′ =   
0 m =   
0 c =   
D 
c 
m   15 
holdings of foreign assets will increase to a higher stationary level. The  current 
account must be running a surplus  when the monetary policy occurs. Thus 
consumption jumps to a level lower than  c   at first, and then adjusts to the new 
steady state along the saddle path. The real balances will also jump downward at the 
initial stage, but at the new steady state we have  mm ′ > . The economy adjusts to a 
point like  D  at time  0 t = . 
The monetary policy causes both  consumption  and real balances to fluctuate 
during the process. As the real balances increase at the new steady state, the exchange 
rate will exhibit undershooting in the long run. At time  0 t = ,  the exchange rate 
exhibits overshooting. 
 
3. An Increase in Government Consumption 
Suppose there is an increase in the government consumption  ---  from  g   to 
gg ′ > . From the dynamic system, we easily see this is equivalent to a permanent rise 




4. Output shock 
Suppose there is a permanent increase in the output level. In a traditional Keynes 
view, consumption, savings and real balances will increase as the disposable income 
expands. Foreign bond holdings will also increase, which means a current account 
surplus at the initial stage.  To examine whether our model is congruent with 
traditional results, we differentiate the dynamic system at its long run equilibrium to 
find how variables respond to the output shock 
  0 cm F y dc dm dF dy ψψ ψ ψ + + += ,  (31) 
  0 cm x dc x dm += ,  (32) 
  dy rdF dc += .  (33)   16 




Suppose a permanent positive output shock occurs. This shock will not affect the long 
run level of consumption and real balances, but has negative effect on the long-run 
foreign bond holdings.   
 
    The intuition behind our findings is that households capitalize all future output 
flows, which is equivalent to hold an equal amount of another financial asset, say 
foreign bonds or government bonds, which, in addition, must also earn a fixed interest 
of  r .  In our model, the capitalized output flow and foreign bonds are perfect 
substitutes in that  / yr   and  F appear in the model in terms of  / yr F +  
everywhere. In the short run, foreign bond holdings will adjust slowly towards its new 
level, but in the long run, the sum of  / yr   and  F   will restore to the original level. 
 
Because the foreign bond holdings decrease in the long run, the current account 
must run a deficit during the adjustment. And thus at the time the output shock occurs, 
consumption will rise more than the change of output, which is quite different from 
what traditional Keynes economist told us. The real balances will also jump to a 
higher level, and then move along the saddle path with consumption towards the 
original consumption-real balances steady state locus.  The point E   in figure.4 
depicts the first adjustment of the economy. There would be an appreciation of the 
exchange rate in that price level falls in the short run. To restore the real balances to 
the original value, the inflation rate will exceed the money growth rate along the 
adjustment path, which implies high extent exchange rate depreciation. 
 
Figure 4 
                                                   











The second order condition. 
Note that the first order condition is sufficient for optimality if 
( , ) ( )/ ( ) Mck uc k ρ ≡   and  ( , ) ( )/ ( ) Nmk vm k ρ ≡   are both concave. 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose the utility function  () uc  is strictly increasing and concave. If the 
instantaneous utility function and discount function further satisfy
8, 
2 () 0 u uu ′ ′′ +≤   and 
2 3( ) ρ ρρ ′ ′′ ≤ , then  (,) Mck  is concave in  (,) ck. 
                                                   
8  Note that this condition also implies  0 ρ′′ ≥ , and thus the sign of  () k ρ′   does not matter for optimality. 
0 m =    0 c =   
c 
m 
E   18 











ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ
′′ ′ ′  −
=  ′ ′ ′ ′′ − ⋅− 
, whose determinant is given by, 
2 224 [() ]{ [ 2 () ]() () } / Det H M u u u ρ ρρ ρ ρ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′ = −−   . From the assumptions in the 
lemma, we have 
2 () 0 uu u ′′ ′ −≥ ≥   and 
22 2 () () 0 ρρ ρ ρ ′′ ′ ′ − ≥≥ , which proves that 
[ ( )] 0 Det H M > . Along with the condition that  0 u′′ < , we easily verify the Hessian 
matrix of  (,) Mck  is negative definite, which further proves  (,) Mck  is concave in 
(,) ck. 
By the same procedure, we can also show that  ( , ) ( )/ ( ) Nmk vm k ρ ≡   is 
concave. 
Lemma 2. Suppose the utility function  () vm  is strictly increasing and concave. If the 
instantaneous utility function and discount function further satisfy, 
2 () 0 v vv ′ ′′ +≤   and 
2 3( ) ρ ρρ ′ ′′ ≤ , then  (,) Nmk   is concave in  (,) mk. 
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we easily conclude that  [ ( ) ( )]/ ( ) uc vm k ρ +   is 
concave in  (, ,) cmk  under our assumptions. 
 
Proof of Proposition (Welfare implications of central bank’s intervention): 
From the definition of households’ financial wealth, we have, 
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Note that the denominator,  mF x ψ , is strictly positive. Thus we only have to determine 
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From  0 c =  , we have  / ( )/( ) r H uv ρ ρ λ ρ ρλ ′′ −= − = − + , and thus 
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Combine the fact that 
2 () 0 v vv ′ ′′ +≤ , we have 
2
2 ( ) (2 ) ( ) (2 )
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′′
. 
We conclude that  /0 da dc < . Using the fact that long-run consumption level rises, 
we easily see that  0 da <   ---  the  households’  total capitalized financial wealth 
decreases in the long run. Since the discount factor is positively related to the 
financial wealth, we have  0 dρ < . Note also that W
U
ρ
= , we conclude that the 
social welfare will increase. 
 
Proof of Proposition (Output Shock) 
Solve for the equations (31), (32) and (33). We will have 
 
1
() dF dc dy
r







= − ,  (35) 








ψψ ψ −+ = − .  (36) 










== , and thus the coefficient of  dy   is zero in 
(36). This implies  0 dc dm = = , and  / dF dy r = − . 
 